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Abstract
We propose a model that reconciles two aspects of social capital: social capital as recip-
rocal sharing of favors within a selected group vs. social capital as trust that lubricates
transactions in societies. The core assumption is that individuals have productive poten-
tials, e.g. innovations, that can not be put at use autonomously. However, individuals can
associate in a club to match productive innovator-implementor dyads among the mem-
bers. For a given club, allowing one new member has the effect of a) an increased pool
of innovations and b) an increased pool of potential implementors. Whether a particular
member supports the expansion of the club depends on whether she expects to be an im-
plementor or an innovator. When expansion of membership is decided by vote, both small
exclusive clubs and open clubs encompassing the whole society can emerge. The outcome
depends both on the voting protocol, on the distribution of innovator and implementor
skills, and on the maximal potential club size. Moreover, identical environments may
generate multiple equilibrium club sizes. In which of these the society ends up depends
on the initial conditions and on the voting protocol.
Keywords: Social capital, matching, voting in clubs.
JEL: A13, C78, D71.
1 Introduction
The concept of Social Capital is much used across social sciences to explain a wide range
of phenomena. With its wide use, the exact definition of social capital varies markedly
across disciplines. In particular, the divide appear especially wide between economists
and sociologists. The purpose of the present paper is to present a common analytical
framework where these two notions of social capital emerge as complementary expressions
of the same underlying mechanisms.
Robert Putnam is the scholar who has influenced the most the way economists think
about social capital. He defines social capital as “the features of social organization, such
as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions.” (Putnam, 1993). The premises of his definition lie in one fundamen-
tal question: How is it possible to solve problems of collective actions? Rational behavior
often implies cooperation failure as an equilibrium outcome, as in many classic examples
from the tragedy of the commons to the prisoner dilemma. However, experimental evi-
dence abounds that agents can successfully manage to cooperate for mutual benefit (Led-
yard, 1995). Cooperation requires one fundamental ingredient: trust. Specifically, each
agent must trust others to carry on the mutually beneficial action, rather than defecting.
High mutual trust is found, not surprisingly, among people with very close connections,
such for example family members. More challenging, however, is the extension of mutual
trust beyond the boundaries of the family (or kinship, or clan): “How does personal trust
become social trust?” (Putnam, 1993). According to Putnam, associations of any form —
what he calls “networks of civic engagement” — are crucial. By participating in groups,
individuals enlarge the set of other individuals they can trust. When groups are numerous
and interconnected, the set of trustworthy individuals encompasses the whole society. The
nature of the groups does not matter (chess clubs, choirs, unions, preaching groups, etc),
as long as they connect individuals in stable networks. In turn, these networks facilitate
the establishment and enforcement of norms of reciprocity, which ultimately foster trust.
The influence of Putnam in economics is apparent from the definition of social capital put
forward in the Handbook of Social Economics : “those persistent and shared beliefs and
values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable
activities.” (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2011), that has received widespread adoption
in economics (Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini, and Troiano, 2013; Padró Miquel, Qian, Xu,
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and Yao, 2015; Casas, Dı́az, and Trindade, 2017). Putnam’s influence also resonates in
one of the most commonly used measure of social capital in the economic literature, the
density of associations (Buonanno, Montolio, and Vanin, 2009; Satyanath, Voigtlaender,
and Voth, 2017), that was originally proposed by Putnam himself (Putnam, 1993).
The sociologist Pierre Bordieau is the social scientist credited to have first introduced
the term social capital. His notion is quite different from Putnam’s. Bordieau thinks of
social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to
[...] membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of the
collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses
of the word.” (Bourdieu, 1986).1 Clearly group membership is central in his definition
as well, but for somewhat different reasons than Putnam’s. Social capital is made of
connections, loyalties and privileges. By belonging to a group, individuals can exploit its
collective means (of different forms: reputation, information, physical capital) to enhance
their trustworthiness (credit), and hence their individual status. Bourdieu is rather vague
on the exact mechanism through which bringing different people together in the same
group enhances individual payoffs, but he explicitly mentions a “multiplier effect” that
increases material and symbolic profits. What he makes very clear, is the exclusive flavor
of social capital: the fundamental feature of each group are its limits. High-social capital
groups are elite clubs, who allow only affluent members, and manage to exclude others in
order to avoid diluting the material value and symbolic prestige of the network: “Through
the introduction of new members into a family, a clan, or a club, the whole definition
of the group, i.e., its fines, its boundaries, and its identity, is put at stake, exposed to
redefinition, alteration, adulteration.” (Bourdieu, 1986). As in Putnam’s definition, the
original purpose of the groups does not matter: “The profits which accrue from member-
ship in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible. This does not
mean that they are consciously pursued as such, [...].”(Bourdieu, 1986).
A perfect example of Bourdieu’s social capital is provided by the recent empirical
work by Haselmann, Schoenherr, and Vig (2018), who analyze members of elite service
clubs in Germany, whose official purpose is charity. Membership in this group is a signal
of high status, and can be obtained by invitation only. The authors show that bankers
1Complete quote: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition –
or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the
collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.”
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who are club members allocate more loans to firms whose CEO belong to the same club,
compared to other firms. Interestingly, they can document that these loans are a form of
crony lending, and they do not originate from better information flow within the network
of club members.2
How to reconcile Bourdieu’s notion of social capital with Putnam’s one? Both notions
build on the possibility for individuals to associate together in groups. However, on one
side of the debate Putnam stresses the inclusive nature of groups, who bring different
people together. Social capital is a public good, and benefits society as a whole; it is a
claim on the individual possessed by the society. The larger the coverage of the club,
the better for the members. On the other side, Bourdieu emphasizes the exclusive nature
of groups, that split individuals between insiders and outsiders. Social capital is a claim
on the social possessed by the individual. Here social capital has the form of favors and
privileges, whose value is diluted if more members are allowed into the group.
Hence, a crucial difference between the two approaches is then the scope of the group,
and its determinants. In the case of favors, members of a groups will want to limit
membership by individuals that may compete for favors but without providing other
favors in exchange. In the case of trust, all individuals who trust others would like
themselves to be trustworthy and also would like others to trust oneself. In order to
reconcile, but also contrast, these two notions we establish a framework where there is
a trade-off between these concerns. The equilibrium object arising from this trade-off is
group size.
We study a model where agents in a population are endowed with one single produc-
tive idea — an innovation, and are at the same time (potentially) able to implement other
agents’ innovations, but not their own. Agents differ in the productivity of their ideas,
and in their implementation capabilities. That agents are excluded from the possibility
of implementing their own idea make cooperation crucial. In their capacity as innovator,
agents must team up with an implementor to generate surplus. Trust is essential: En-
trepreneurs must trust implementors to return back part of the profits. A club assures
that the members can trust each other. We assume that within a club, innovations are
assigned to the best possible implementor among club members. The surplus of each idea
is equally shared between the innovator and implementor. Thus, the club in our model
2Interestingly Haselmann et al. (2018) cite Putnam’s work, but not Bourdieu’s, confirming that the
contribution of the former had more fortune among economists.
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perfectly solves collective action and cooperation problems; members trust each other in
the Putnam sense. Again in Putnam’s spirit, efficiency is maximized when the club is in-
clusive, encompassing the whole society, because then there is optimal matching between
ideas and implementors within the club.3
At the same time, our modeling framework allows for the exclusive nature of Bourdieu’s
social capital. Club members’ ideas are allocated to the best possible implementor among
other club members. When the club is limited in size, the assignment of ideas resembles
exchange of favors. Members, and only members, get to implement each others’ ideas.
Thus small clubs entail efficiency losses as it is generally the case that a better match for
the idea is available among outsiders.
The tension between the two aspects of social capital arise as follows. Innovators
would like to have as many implementors as possible in the club, in order to maximize
the probability of a good match. For the same reason, innovators would also want to
limit the number of entrepreneurs with even better ideas than themselves. Implementors,
however, would want to have as many innovators as possible in the club, and as few other
implementors as possible, because they compete for the same innovations. It adds to the
complexity that each agent, in general, has potential to become both an innovator and
an implementor. Which role is more salient for each agent depends on club size: The
same agent may oppose expansion when the club is small, but she may want to add more
members in a large club.
We consider three different constitutional rules for determining the size of the club. In
the first, the club starts out composed only by the agent with the best innovation. He can
then invite one new member. The invitation process continues, with members voting by
majority rule over inviting new members to join, one new member at a time, or to stop.
In the second, the club starts out as the largest possible club, encompassing all agents in
society. Then, members vote by majority rule over expelling existing members, starting
with the least economically valuable. Third, we consider an autocratic rule in which the
economic leader autonomously decides the scope of the club.
Our framework shares some features with La Ferrara (2002) who considers a group that
delivers a public good at fixed cost, financed by a tax on the group members. Members
of the group get equal access to the good (with some congestion) and pay tax according
3In our implementation, the optimal allocation is found using the Hungarian algorithm developed by
Kuhn (1955) and Munkres (1957).
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to income. Similar to us, she is interested in the equilibrium group size, and on how
this depends on the heterogeneity of the population. Like in her paper, we consider how
different constitutional rules lead to different group sizes.4 Contrary to us, she studies
individual incentives in group participation, while in our model all agents always want to
participate in the club. The mechanism that generates incentives to limit or expand group
size is different in the two models. In particular, in our model agents have a rationale for
inviting individuals less productive than themselves, whilst in La Ferrara (2002) agents
would prefer that only individuals richer than themselves participate.
Our model assumes trust and efficient allocation rules within the club. It is silent
on how exactly group participation enables individuals to overcome the collective action
problem. A complementary work, therefore, is the paper by Tabellini (2008), who provides
a microfoundation for cooperation between agents in a large society, sustained by both
economic incentives and cultural values. Another paper in the same spirit as ours is
Sabatini (2009) who also has the elusiveness of the concept ”social capital” as a starting
point but who’s main focus is on the empirical side.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we explore a simplified
model to describe analytically the mechanisms at play; in section 3 we introduce the
complete model, which is simulated for different parameters in section 4. Finally, section
5 discusses the results and concludes.
2 The mechanisms: matching versus rent sharing
Before going into the assignment problem in all its details, we start by investigating a
stylized set up which allows us to study analytically the mechanisms at play. Compared to
the main model, we do some simplifying assumptions: First, all ideas that can be imple-
mented are effectively implemented, and the resulting surplus is shared equally between
innovator and implementor. Second, there is a fixed rent R to be shared equally between
all the club members. Third, all agents are ex ante identical.5
The economy is populated by n identical agents, each endowed with an idea worth x.
To deliver its surplus x, an idea must be implemented. Agents can not implement their
4In particular, she consider two rules: open access where everyone can join; and group formation by
majority voting where the median voter has agenda-setting powers.
5The fixed rent is derived endogenously in the complete setup, as we introduce heterogeneity between
workers’ ideas. This will give an incentive to limit the number of members in the club.
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own ideas, but can potentially implement other agents’ ideas, as long as they are part
of a club. The club is a group of agents of size m ≤ n. Cooperation is always needed
to generate any surplus and cooperation is only possible between club members. The
probability that agent i can implement the idea of agent j is p.
Considering the club as a long-term institution whose members interact repeatedly




where f(m) = m · [1− (1− p)m−1] . (1)
Here, the first part of the profit function is the rent component, while the second is the
surplus yielded by the productive ideas. Each idea has (m − 1) potential implementors.
Each agent has a probability p of being able to implement someone else’s idea. Thus
[1 − (1 − p)m−1] is the probability that at least one of the (m − 1) other members can
implement i’s idea, and also the fraction of implemented ideas.6 The function f(m) can
be interpreted as the matching technology, and corresponds to the expected number of
implemented ideas. It features increasing returns to scale.7




≥ 0 ⇐⇒ x
∂f(m)
∂m
≥ πi . (2)
This condition is familiar from the analysis of owner managed firms: new employees will
be hired as long as the contribution from a new employee is larger that the prevailing
income to each existing employee (Meade, 1972). In the current setting the contribution
from a new club member is the improvement in the matching ideas to implementors. This
matching effect is held up against the dilution of rents R. By using equations (1) and (2),
the condition for expanding the club size is
R/x ≤ mf ′(m)− f(m) = −(1− p)m−1m2 ln(1− p) . (3)
The left hand side of (3) is the value of the rent relative to the value of one idea. The
right hand side is a measure of the increasing return to scale of the matching technology,
6From the Binomial distribution.
7It is easy to check that f(a ·m) > a · f(m) ∀a > 1.
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and it is larger the more convex the f(·) function. In order for an increase in club size
to pay off for existing members, the increase in surplus due to the increasing returns to
scale has to exceed the effect from dilution of the exogenous rents R. The right hand side
of (3) is hump-shaped in m, starting at − ln(1− p) and asymptotically approaching zero
as m → ∞. It has a maximum for m = −2/ ln(1 − p).8 We plot the right hand side in
Figure 1 together with three alternative values of R/x, which exemplify three different
cases.
Figure 1: First order condition, matching versus rent sharing





























































































































































































































































































First, if the rent element is low relative to the value of the ideas, R/x = (R/x)l, then
the right hand side of (3) is larger than R/x and the positive matching effect resulting
from new members to the club dominates for moderately sized clubs. The club is expanded
until matching is almost certain for all existing club members. In the example, m = 26
is the club size where the rent dilution effects dominates the matching gain, and further
expansion generates a loss for the existing members.
Second, when the rent is large relative to the value of ideas, R/x = (R/x)h, the rent
dilution effect is strong for all m and too strong for the first member to want to invite
another member to the club. In the case of only one member, no productive matching will
be realized and the single club member will enjoy R without competition. Furthermore,
for any club size m ≥ 2 the existing members would prefer a smaller club, provided they
8Moreover, the condition for the hump of the right hand side to be relevant (that it, is to the right of
m = 1) is that its value at m = 3 is larger than its value at m = 2. The condition for this is p < 3/4.
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Figure 2: Return function for intermediate R/x








































































































































themselves could remain as member.
Finally, when the rent/idea ratio is at an intermediate level, R/x = (R/x)∗, for small
m the rent dilution effect dominates and return to club members would decline when m
increases (say from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3). For m higher than B, however, the matching
effect dominates and expansion of the club increases the return for all club members.
The reason for this change in sign is that the value of the matching effect becomes more
important as the pool of unmatched members of the club increases. In Figure 1, when
R/x = (R/x)∗, the club members would benefit from expanding the club all the way until
the point A. For m to the right of A, however, a reduction in club size improves club
members’ income. The return function in the intermediate case of R/x = 1 is plotted in
Figure 2.
This intermediate case illustrates one of the core tensions at play also in the main
model below: The rent dilution effect gives an incentive to limit the size of the club, i.e.
to keep it closed, while the matching effect gives an incentive to increase the size of the
club, i.e. to keep it open. The former is social capital as exclusive access to privileges
à la Bourdieu, the latter is social capital as efficient networks à la Putnam. At point
A, these aspects exactly balance. To the right of A the Bourdieu logic dominates and
club members would like to see the club size reduced. To the left of A the Putnam logic
dominates and club members would like to see the club size increased.
In the rest of the paper, we explore these mechanisms in a richer model, that allows
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for heterogeneity across agents, and which is disciplined by a more stringent matching
process. In this fully-fledged model, the rent aspect will appear endogenously, and it will
come in the the form of exchange of favors. The contribution of new members will depend
both on the value of their innovation and on their potential role as innovators.
3 The Model
As above, the economy is populated by n agents. Each agent is (potentially) both an inno-
vator and an implementor: in the former capacity, he has a business idea of productivity
greater than or equal to zero; in the latter capacity, he may be able to implement other
agents’ ideas, either perfectly or mediocrely. When an idea is implemented, it generates
a surplus. If the implementor is a perfect match for the idea, the surplus is equal to its
productivity. If the implementor is a mediocre match, the surplus is equal to β times the
productivity of the idea, where 0 ≤ β < 1. We typically have in mind values of β close to
0. Each agent can implement at most one idea, but he is never able to implement his own
idea, not even mediocrely. Hence, cooperation is always needed to generate any surplus.
Formally, Y is the n × n matrix of implementation capabilities indicators such that:
yi,j = 1 if agent i is perfectly able to implement the idea of agent j; yi,j = β if agent i is
mediocrely able to implement the idea of agent j; and yi,i = 0 ∀i, i.e. the elements on
the main diagonal are equal to zero because agents are never able to implement their own
ideas. The matrix Y is stochastic: Each element in column j off the diagonal are Bernoulli
trials with parameter pj. In other words, for all agents i 6= j, pj is the probability that
agent i can implement perfectly j’s idea. We denote the vector of all these Bernoulli
probabilities p. The vector of entrepreneurial ideas of each agent is denoted by the
n−vector x, where xi ≥ 0 ∀i. The production potential of the economy is fully described
by the n× n matrix
A = Y diag(x), (4)
where each element ai,j ≥ 0 is the surplus created if agent i implements agent j’s idea.
A club C is a square sub-matrix of A of dimension smaller or equal to n, obtained by
deleting columns and rows with the same index.9 The objective of a club is to efficiently
9For example, the sub-matrix obtained by deleting the first row and the first column is a club, but
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allocate ideas to implementors. The allocation is obtained by selecting the elements of C
to yield C̃, so that only one c̃i,j > 0 remains in each row and each column of C̃. There
are several mutually excluding allocations of ideas to implementors, as in general there
are overlaps in the implementation capacities, both across implementors for each idea,
and across ideas for each implementor. Moreover, these allocations in general generates
different total surplus. We work from the assumption that the club chooses the allocation
that maximizes average (or total) surplus for the club members. Moreover, we assume
that the surplus created by each dyad is shared in equal parts between the implementor
and the innovator, leaving nothing for agents outside this dyad.10 Agent i’s profit is,
therefore, the sum of his profit as an entrepreneur and his profit as an implementor. The
vector of profits is therefore
Π = 1/2(C̃1n + C̃
′1n). (5)
The problem for the club is to assign implementors to ideas, that is to find the C̃ that
maximizes the sum of Π. This assignment problem is a classic in combinatorial optimiza-
tion theory, and to obtain the solution we can rely on the Hungarian algorithm developed
by Kuhn (1955) and Munkres (1957).11
We think of a club as a long lasting institution rather than as an ad hoc arrangement.
Our assumption reflects the evidence that norms of societal cooperation are very persistent
across centuries (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2016). In particular, the club is initially
formed according to the prevailing constitutional rule, and then the production game
starts and continue forever. Specifically we assume the following timing:
-1) The following primitives are realized: x,p, n, β.
0) A club is formed according to the prevailing constitutional rule. The club includes
m ≤ n agents.
1) Y1 is realized, the club allocates optimally ideas to implementors, production takes
place and surplus is shared and consumed.
the sub-matrix obtained deleting the first row and the second column is not.
10This assumption could be modified in a number of ways. In particular, shares could be determined
by outside options of the participants of the dyad. From our set up it is not a priori clear who has most
to lose from dropping out. An exogenous split of 50/50 could be interpreted as a focal point solution
across environments.
11We use a Matlab implementation, developed by Yi Cao.
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2) Step 1) is repeated for t = 2, ..., T , with T → ∞.
After stage -1), the profit for each member of each potential club can be calculated in
expectation. Expected profits form the basis for the club formation decision.
We consider three constitutional rules that allow agents to associate in groups: elite
discretion, invitation, and expulsion, where the two latter involves majority voting among
club members.
Under elite discretion, the agent with the most valuable idea decides on whether to
invite or exclude club members at own discretion.
Under invitation rule, we assume that an initial club is formed by the agent with the
most valuable idea and new members are recruited in sequence according to the value of
their idea. The first member decide on whether to invite the second in line. If invited,
those two then have a vote over to admit a third member. Majority rule applies, and ties
result in invitations. If the third agent is invited to join, a new vote is taken by the three
members over inviting the fourth. Votes continue in this fashion until one invitation is
rejected by the majority: at that point the current club members remain the permanent
configuration of the club.
Under expulsion rule, the initial club includes all agents. First, a vote is taken over
permanently expelling the agent with the least productive idea. Majority rules apply,
and ties result in keeping the agent. If expulsion is approved, a new vote is taken over
the agent which has now the least valuable idea. Votes continue until one expulsion is
rejected. At that point, the surviving club members are the permanent configuration of
the club.
4 The Simulations
In order to analyze the voting equilibriums, we first need to derive the expected profits
for each agent under different club configurations. In order to do so, we rely on averaging
over repeated simulations.12 In all the simulations below, we fix the population size to
n = 20. Importantly, we assume that the elements of x are never exactly equal to each
other: there are at least some ǫ differences between agents’ ideas. This implies that we
can assume that x is sorted in strictly ascending order. Notice that the constitutional
12At least 10,000.
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rules under consideration have the property that a club can only be formed among agents
sitting in adjacent elements of the ordered vector x. This property of our club reflects the
evidence that group cooperation is easier among similar individuals, rather than among
heterogeneous ones (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). Furthermore, this property reduces
drastically the possible club configurations that we need to consider when constructing the
expected profits, reducing accordingly the computation burden. We focus our attention
on different cases that arise from different combinations of x and p. Each case represents
an archetypal society whose population is characterized by a given economic distribution.
4.1 Society 1: Monopolized privileges
First, we study a society where the production potential of the economy is concentrated
in the hands of one single individual. There is only one agent who has (or is handed
by a royal privilege) a productive idea, while the others have ideas whose productivity is
negligible. In particular, we simulate the scenario with x1 > 0, and xi ≈ 0 ∀i ≥ 2.
13
Figure 3 plots the expected profits (denoted with π) for the first seven agents as a
function of club size. The preferred club size for each agent is marked with a dot. The
profit of the only agent endowed with a productive idea is depicted by the red curve,
which has an intuitive interpretation: When agent 1 is alone in the club, the surplus
is zero because nobody is around to implement his idea. As more agents are included,
expected profit for agent 1 strictly increases as the probability that at least one of the
other agents is able to implement perfectly (rather than mediocrely) his idea strictly
increases. The curve is concave, as the marginal contribution of having one additional
implementor is decreasing in group size. In particular, already when the club is formed
by thirteen members, the probability of having at least one exact implementor is 0.99.
For all the other agents, the expected profits are instead strictly decreasing in group size.
Adding more members results only in increased competition for the unique idea available,
as only the first agent is endowed with a significant productive idea.
This simple scenario illustrates one main mechanism at play, namely that agents on the
short side of the interaction, the innovator with the idea, want expansion while the ones
on the long side, the implementors, want constraints on the expansion of the club (as long
13x1 = 3, and xi = 0
+ ∀i ≥ 2. All agents are potentially equally able to perfectly implement other
agents’ ideas: pi = p = 1/3 ∀i. Ideas handed over to a mediocre implementor yield one fifth of their
value, that is β = 1/5.
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Figure 3: Monopolized privileges
as they themselves are members).14 The societal surplus, however, goes unambiguously
up as the size of the club increases. This feature follows by the matching protocol, and is
readily seen from the diagram, as the total surplus is twice agent 1’s surplus.
If it is up to the elite to decide (under elite discretion), we get an open club, i.e.
mD = 20 = n. The reason is that the elite is a single agent that has no incentive to
limit expansion of the club. The elite agent does not see a subset of the other agents as
particularly valuable club mates that she can exchange favors with.
Under invitation rule, however, the process of club expansion stops quite early. Agent
1 is the only in favor of inviting more members, and so she can only get to invite two
additional members. When m = 3 the common interest of agents 2 and 3 blocks any
further expansion. Thus the equilibrium club size under invitation rule is mI = 3.
Under expulsion rule, the voting equilibrium is slightly more involved. When agents
vote over someone’s expulsion, they realize that any expulsion will result in a new vote
over the next agent in line; this process may eventually lead to their own expulsion.
Solving the voting game by backward induction results in mE = 18.15 The risk of own
expulsion is a powerful motive to vote against somebody else’s expulsion in order to stop
14The mechanism is analogous to the rent dilution effect described in the simplified framework of section
2.
15The proof of this result and all the other proofs are collected in Appendix A.
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votes, and consolidate club size. Going beyond this particular example, and extrapolating
the profit functions for n > 20, the exact equilibrium size under expulsion rule depends on
n. This is illustrated in Figure 4 where the stepwise line shows that mE is sometimes as
large as n and never lower than n/2.16 Hence, under this voting protocol, large clubs can
be sustained, even though not necessarily encompassing the whole society, but including
at least approximately half of the population.
Figure 4: Monopolized privileges: voting equilibria under expulsion rule.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this society, the distribution of ideas and implementation skills gives an unambigu-
ous conflict of interest: The elite agent wants an open club, while other members want the
club to be as small as possible. The resulting club size will crucially depend on the exact
constitutional rule: exclusive club under invitation rule, inclusive club under expulsion
rule. Hence in this society the economic environment itself can support several club sizes,
and the constitutional rule is the key ingredient to resolve the conflict of interest, and
arrive at the equilibrium club size.
Here the Bourdieu inspired notion of keeping the club exclusive is the predominant
force for most agents. The interest of the fringe is in line with Bourdieu, while only the
interest of the elite, who gains from optimal matching, is in line with Putnam. Paradox-
ically, in this elitist environment, it is only with elite discretion that the club is open,
encompassing everyone. Under expulsion rule a quite large and inclusive club could be
sustained, however, by fear: Agents keep others in order to preempt an unraveling where
they themselves may be next in line to be expelled.
16See Appendix A for details.
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4.2 Society 2: Aristocracy privileges
We now move to a society where not only one but a handful of individuals control the
privileges and the production capacity of the economy. In particular, we consider an
economy similar to the above but where the productive ideas are shared between two
agents - the only two memebrs of the aristocracy.17
Figure 5 plots the expected profits for the first seven agents as a function of club size.
The red line refers to agent 1, and the black line to agent 2. In contrast to scenario 1, now
the profit function for agent 1 is not strictly increasing, but it has an interior maximum.
Agent 2 has an identical profit function. Consider the minimal club including only agents
1 and 2. Their expected profit comes from two sources: from implementing the other
agent’s ideas, and from the other agent implementing their own idea. By this exchange of
benefits they gain a lot relative to the fringe that is left without any idea to implement.
Now if one from the fringe is allowed to enter, the entrepreneurial return to agent 1 and
2 goes up. The reason is that the probability that their idea is implemented exactly
goes up. However, agent 1’s share of profit from implementing agent 2’s idea is falling as
more members are admitted, due to the increased competition among implementors. The
same is true for agent 2 in his role as potential implementor of agent 1’s idea. These two
effects work in opposite direction. At first, the increasing entrepreneurial returns more
than offset the decreasing implementation returns. Eventually, the marginal gain from
increasing the probability of finding a good match does not offset the loss due to increased
competition for implementing the other top agent’s idea. Hence, for agents 1 and 2, the
optimal club size is between 2 and n, in this case 9. For the fringe composed by all other
agents, the expected profits are again falling in group size, as they are only subject to
the dilution by competition. In other words, the fringe sees the two ideas as a rent to not
dilute, or as favors to share within a exclusive club. It is worth noting that in Society 2,
in contrast to Society 1, there is no longer any agent with interests aligned with the social
interest.
Turning to the analysis of the equilibrium club size under different constitutional rules,
a contrast to Society 1 immediately emerges. Under invitation rule, the equilibrium club
size is now higher. The productive set of agents counts one more member, so now both
17In particular, we simulate the scenario with x1 = x2 = 3 and xi = 0
+ ∀i = 3, ..., 20. Moreover,
β = 1/5 and p = 1/3.
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Figure 5: Aristocracy privileges
agents 1 and 2 favor expansion for small m. Their combined votes manage to reach a club
of size mI = 5 before expansion stops.
Also under expulsion rule the equilibrium club size is different than in Society 1. In
particular, it is smaller : mE = 16. The intuitive reason is that for large enough clubs,
agent 1 and 2 side with their direct neighbors in x, and vote in favor of expulsion, because
their bliss point is smaller than n. However, extrapolating again for n > 20, the expulsion
rule can sustain large clubs as was the case in Society 1.18 For large n, it no longer matters
whether the elite is made up of one or of two agents.
The sharpest contrast to Society 1 appears in the case of elite discretion. Here, the
exchange-of-favors effect generates an optimal club size of mD = 9. In Society 2 the elite,
composed here by more than one agent, has an interest in keeping the club smaller.
While Society 1 had the elite subscribing to Putnam and the fringe subscribing to
Bourdieu, in Society 2 the elite has some of each. Here the aristocracy wants some of
the fringe in the club to increase the likelihood of realizing their own ideas. However,
they do not want the club to be too large, as that completely dilutes their own chance of
implementing their fellow elite’s idea. Thus it is the mix of the two notions that generates
the non-monotonicity in their return schedule. In their optimum, m = 9, the Putnam’s
logic of inclusion exactly balances the Bourdieu’s logic of exclusion.
18See Appendix A.
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Society 2 bis: Aristocracy privileges redux A slightly different aristocracy is the
one where two members of the aristocracy are endowed with productive ideas, but where
one is better than the other.19 We plot expected profits as a function of club size for
the first seven agents in Figure 6. Agent 1’s profit (red line) exhibits the same pattern
as in Figure 5, due to the same underlying mechanism. Agent 2’s profit (black line) is
slightly different from the previous case: It follows a similar pattern, but his preferred
club is smaller, because his idea is less valuable compared to agent 1’s. This implies that
the gain from exclusive access to the other top agent’s idea dominates the matching effect
sooner for agent 2 than for agent 1. All the other agents’ profit are decreasing in club size
for the same reasons as in Society 1 and 2.
Under either invitation or expulsion rule, this modification of Society 2 has no effects
on club size. However, under elite discretion, the club size is higher compared to Society
2, because agent 1 now has less to gain from exclusive access to agent 2’s idea. Agent 1
thus appreciates more Putnam’s logic in favor of inclusive clubs.













Figure 6: Aristocracy privileges redux.
19In particular: x1 = 3, x2 = 2.5, xi = 0
+ ∀i =≥ 3, β = 1/5, and p = 1/3 ∀j.
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4.3 Society 3: Diffuse entrepreneurship
We now turn to analyze a society characterized by relatively homogeneous and productive
population of agents. This case resembles a modern society. Everybody is endowed with a
productive idea, and differences between ideas are small.20 In this case, all the agents are
subject to the two competing forces at play as the club expands: increasing probability
of finding a good match to implement their own idea, but also increasing competition for
implementation of other ideas. Figure 7 plots the expected profit of all the agents as a
function of group size. Interestingly, the first eight agents agree on their preferred club
size. In particular, they favor expansion for clubs of small size, but at some point they
would like to stop further expansion. The reason is that at some point, each of these first
agents is almost sure to find someone able to implement exactly his own idea, and also
to get assigned somebody else’s idea. Further expansion beyond this point would lead to
increased availability of new ideas, but of lower productivity than those already available.
Crucially, further expansion would also lead to dilution of the existing implementation
profits due to increased competition for the best ideas available. The profit function is at
first increasing, and then decreasing for agents 1 to 12, while the rest of the agents display
a pattern similar to the fringe in society 1. In fact, clubs larger than (m ≥ 12) already
ensure high probability of forming high-quality dyads, and adding many more agents only
result in much fiercer competition for the insiders.
The invitation rule would allow the first eight agents to exactly reach their bliss point,
as they all agree about continuing to invite members until size mI = 10 is reached. At
that point, the two agents who have joined last would like further expansion, but the
block of the first eight agents vote agains it. In this society, the expulsion rule would
instead result in an equilibrium club which encompasses the entire society. In fact, the
threat of expulsion forces the ten least productive agents to stick together and vote to
save agent 20 in the first vote. They do so because they can foresee that expulsion of
agent 20 would be followed by many more, until agents 1-10 would attain m = 10, which
is the bliss point of the first eight agents. The election over expelling agent 20 would thus
result in a tie and so in a permanent club of size mE = 20. Extrapolating beyond n = 20,
the expulsion rule would always result in clubs as large as at least half of the population.
In this society, Putnam’s and Bourdieu’s logics cohabit within each agent. Nonetheless,
20In particular: x1 = 20, xi = xi−1 − 1 ∀i > 1, β = 1/5, and p = 1/3 ∀j.
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Figure 7: Diffuse entrepreneurship.
large and even all-encompassing clubs in Putnam’s spirit can emerge under the expulsion
protocol, sustained by the fear of being evicted. Instead, under elite discretion and
invitation rule, the coexistence of the two notions for each agent results in clubs of medium
size. A group of relatively homogeneous agents is formed, and the exact club size is
the point where Putnam’s logic and Bourdieu’s logic exactly balance. These clubs are
relatively inclusive, as the difference between the most and least productive members is
large, but also exclusive, as a large part of productive population is left out.
4.4 Society 4: Privileges versus ideas
We now revisit Society 1, where one idea stood out as the only profitable. This is a
strong assumption if “idea” is to be taken literally, but in a generic interpretation the
“idea” could be a feudal privilege to do a particular trade. In Society 1 the holder of the
profitable idea would like to see a club as large as possible in order to be sure to have
the idea implemented. The implementors, on the other hand, would all of them want to
limit the size of the club, in order to maximize their own chance of being the implementor
taking part in the profit. It is the sharp distinction between the interest of the innovator
and implementors that delivers the sharp result in society 1. No one is part innovator
and part implementor.
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The situation changes fundamentally if all agents have ideas, albeit with different pro-
ductivity. More precisely, we here assume that all agents have potentially equally valuable
ideas. The idea of agent 1 can again be though of as a feudal privilege to do a particu-
lar trade. Such a privilege has a trivial profit potential, and thus it is relatively simple
to implement. On the contrary, the other agents’ ideas are ingenious entrepreneurial
ideas. Hence, typically a large pool of potential implementors is needed in order to find
a productive match. Formally, we assume that x is constant for all agents, but now the
probability of a match is heterogeneous: p1 > pl = pi ∀i ≥ 2. Furthermore, we abstract
from mediocre matches, i.e. β = 0.21
This society is illustrated in Figure 8. The main new feature is that as m increases
beyond a certain number, the expected profits of all agents increases in m. This follows
because when m is sufficiently high, a larger fraction of the m− 1 ingenious ideas can be
implemented. Hence, the expected profits for all agents will increase. The profit function
for agent 1 increases for all m. It increases quite sharply in the beginning as his own
idea is more and more likely to be implemented. It continues to increase, however, as for
large m it becomes more and more likely that 1 can also earn income from implementing
others’ ideas. The profit relationship for agent 2 (and 3, 4, 5, 6) is first decreasing in m.
The reason is that for small m, the main concern is to be the one who takes part in agent
1’s idea. However, as m grows larger, it becomes yet more likely that someone is able
implement agent 2’s own ingenious idea, and that agent 2 can himself implement someone
else’s ingenious idea.
Society 4 shares many of the features we saw in the simplified framework in section 3.
One difference is that here the rents are endogenously generated by agent’s 1 innovation.
For the other agents, the competition to have a chance to be matched with this high value
innovation resembles the dilution of the exogenous rents taking place in the simplified
model as the club expands. This mechanism is the factor behind the decreasing profile
of the profit function, which prevails for small m both in Figure 2 and for the fringe in
Figure 8.
What clubs would prevail under different constitutional rules? In the particular con-
figuration with n = 20, the invitation rule would lead to a club of size mI = 20. The
reason is that all but agent 2 prefer 20 to any number of members less than 20.22 With a
21The parameters in the simulation are: x = 3 ∀i ; β = 0; p = [7/12, 1/67, ...1/67]
22If voting over club expansion entailed a time delay, and if there also was discounting, the expansion
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Figure 8: Privileges versus ideas.
population of size smaller than 20, say n = 16, also agents 3 and 4 would prefer to limit
the expansion. As a result, only agent 3 would be admitted, because at m = 3 agents 2
and 3 prefer to stop further admittance. The reason is simple enough: None of the feasible
m under further expansion yields larger return than m = 3. If instead n was larger than
20, also agent 2 would support an open club of maximal size. The reason is again simple:
When m is very large, the fraction of ingenious ideas implemented will approach unity.23





= p(m− 2) . (6)
As m grows, the number of potential matches outnumbers the number of ideas by orders
of magnitude, and, in spite of some overlaps between matches, the expected fraction of
implemented matches approaches unity.24
Going back to the example in Figure 8, the matching mechanism in equation (6) leads
to an open club of maximal size also under expulsion rule. In general, mE = n as long as
n is large enough to ensure enough matching improvement in the all-encompassing club.
On the contrary, small societies (e.g, n = 7) would look like Figure 3: Small expansion
of the club in Figure 8 could instead get stuck at several intermediate sizes. Starting from club sizes
between 3 and 7, expansion to one additional member would not be immediately profitable to a majority
of the existing members.
23The privilege of agent 1 will be implemented as well.
24As such, all the profit schedules in Figure 8 will converge to 3 as m grows large.
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potential would prevent the matching return from taking off. In this case, the expulsion
rule would lead to exclusive clubs: mE < n.
Finally, elite discretion would lead to an open club. The reason is trivial: Agent 1
follows completely Putnam’s logic, as in Society 1. For all the other agents, Putnam’s
and Bourdieu’s notions coexist, and which one prevails depends on the size of the clubs.
As in all the previous cases, the mix between Bourdieu’s and Putnam’s logics in the same
agents results in the non-monotonicity of their return function. However, here the return
function is u-shaped, while it in all the previous cases was hump-shaped.
In this society, the Putnam inspired notion of opening the club is the predominant
force in most cases. The fundamental reason that leads to open clubs here is the fact that
newcomers have something valuable to contribute to both sides of the economic exchanges.
4.5 Society 5: Aristocracy and bourgeoisie
The u-shaped return schedules of the fringe in Society 4 is a result of the fellow fringe
members first representing a congesting factor over the rents attached to agent 1’s priv-
ilege. Then, as m gets larger, the fringe represent a yet larger pool of new ideas that
with increasing probability can be put to profitable use. The first congestion effect is
not relevant for agent 1 as he holds the privilege in the first place. As such, his return
schedule is monotonously (weakly) increasing in m.
We now modify Society 4 by introducing an additional privileged agent as we did in
Society 2.25 In Society 2, having two privileged lead the elite to have an hump-shaped
schedule (see Figure 5). Here instead, where we study a case with two privileges and a
fringe of ideas, the return schedule of the elite displays again a hump, but it also starts
growing again for large enough m (see Figure 9). The explanation behind the hump is
the same as before: With more than one privilege, also the aristocracy is affected by the
congesting factor caused by the fringe. For very small m, the aristocracy benefits from
admitting new members as this increase matching. Soon enough however, the increased
competition over the other top agent’s privilege offsets the gain from improved matching
for their own privilege. To the right of this point, new members represent a congesting
factor that dilutes the rent. However, in the present case, for even higher levels of m, the
return of the two first agents starts increasing again. The reason is the same as the one
25Formally, we assume: x = 3 ∀i ; β = 0; p = [7/12, 7/12, 1/67, ...1/67] .
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behind the u-shape of the fringe in Society 4: When m is large the number of potential
matches grows faster than the number of ideas. In other words, for large m it is more
and more likely that agent 1 and 2 become able to implement at least one idea brought
along by the new-comers. In the particular example in Figure 9, the return to the first
two agents has a global maximum at m = 5, a local minimum at m = 11, and then a
local maximum at the corner m = n = 20.














Figure 9: Aristocracy and bourgeoisie
The invitation rule will yield mI = 5 as the equilibrium: After the club has reached
5 members all of them will vote against further expansion. The reason is that no club
with m > 5 gives higher returns than what each member get at m = 5. Thus in this
case Bourdieu’s notion dominates, and the club is exclusive. This equilibrium is however
sensitive to the exact size of the population. In fact, for n large enough (in this case for
n ≥ 23), all the agents (both elite and fringe) would strictly prefer an open club, m = n.
The reason has again to do with the matching mechanism in equation (6): For m large
enough, virtually all ideas are implemented and each agent earns profit equal to 3.
In the example depicted in Figure 8, the expulsion rule yields open clubs, mE = 20.
The reason is simple enough: A club of size 20 is strictly preferred to any smaller club
by a majority of members, and so no one will be expelled at m = 20.26 In this case, it
26It is only 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 who prefers a m < 20.
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is not fear of being expelled that sustains an open club, but rather pure non-strategic
economic convenience. For this reason, open clubs will also emerge for societies with
n > 16, where the maximal club size is large enough for the benefit of the matching
to outweigh the dilution of the rent from the aristocracy. Smaller societies will remain
trapped in Bourdieu’s logic, and yields exclusive clubs.
Similar outcomes will prevail in case of elite discretion: In small societies, i.e. n < 23,
the aristocracy would prefer an exclusive club of only five members. In these cases, they
prefer to exchange favors among few members because the benefits from opening the club
are not high enough. On the contrary, in large societies, i.e. n ≥ 23, these benefits are
high enough, and the aristocracy always prefer open clubs.
Also in this society, as in Society 4, the fact that everyone has something valuable to
contribute on both sides of the exchange facilitates the emergence of open clubs, which can
arise under every voting rule. Contrary to the previous case, however, here the aristocracy
has a local optimum a low value of m.
To summarize, Society 5 Aristocracy and bourgeoisie contains all the main elements
that we were interested in. It shows that the same underlying economic environment
can generate both inclusive clubs and exclusive clubs. The final outcome depends on the
constitutional rule. The size of society, n, is a key parameter. Given the productivity
parameters, for sufficiently large societies, everyone benefits from embracing the inclusive
club. However, in order for a small club to expand sufficiently for all members to benefit
from a large club, both the aristocracy and the other club members go trough an interval
of reduced profits. Hence, in such a case the exclusive club may remain as the equilibrium.
The reason is that exclusive club is a local optimum. Then moving to an open club requires
both a) imagination about what an open club entails, and b) willingness to wait for the
benefits of improved efficiency to materialize. Both these conditions may easily be broken
both for a conservative aristocracy and for an elitist bourgeoisie who care about their
relative distance to other citizens.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Starting from two different literatures, we have highlighted two roles of social capital:
a) as a lubricant for efficient transactions between factors of production; b) as a source
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of crony favors and access to privileges. Interpreting social capital as a productive asset
provided by a social group, these two roles can explain how social capital can both capture
closed clubs, where favors dominate, and open associations, where efficiency dominates.
In the stylized case of a club, we have illustrated the forces at play, using a matching
algorithm for production combined with voting rules for member invitations and expul-
sions. We have also brought to the fore the tension between the two aspects of social
capital. We have shown how under different voting rules over membership, and starting
from different initial conditions, the scope of the club may vary from a closed exclusive
one to an open one that embraces all members of society.
The incentives of the insiders to expand or limit the club depend on the relative
importance of privileges versus efficiency. For a small club, the privilege aspect tends to
be relatively more important, while for larger clubs this aspect is diluted. Therefore, the
same underlying primitives can both generate clubs that stay closed and exclusive, and
clubs that encompass the entire society.
For a given set of parameters, a club starting in the small may stay small, while, for the
same parameters, if the club started large it would remain large. We have identified two
separate reasons for all-encompassing clubs to prevail. First, a majority of members of a
large club may actually lose from any reduction in club size. Second, given the expulsion
voting protocol, a majority of voters may realize that if one member is evicted a process
will start whereby they themselves are evicted.
In order for a majority to prefer a large club, the efficiency mechanism must be suf-
ficiently high relative to the privilege. While the rents tend to be diluted with the size
of the club, a similar dilution does not necessarily need to affect the efficiency gains. To
the contrary, the size of the club may strengthen the efficiency gains. The last two cases
analyzed in the paper show that when candidate members bring valuable productive as-
sets (innovations), the initial size of the club is critical. The larger the club, the larger
the probability of a productive match with the newcomers, and the more the newcomers
contribute to the total production of the club. An innovation that is productive in a
large club may be virtually unproductive in a small club, if it is not trivial to put at use.
Therefore, a small society may generate small exclusive clubs, while large societies may
generate all-encompassing open clubs.
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Padró Miquel, G., N. Qian, Y. Xu, and Y. Yao (2015). Making Democracy Work: Culture,
Social Capital and Elections in China.
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
Sabatini, F. (2009). Social capital as social networks: A new framework for measurement
and an empirical analysis of its determinants and consequences. The Journal of Socio-
Economics 38 (3), 429–442.
Satyanath, S., N. Voigtlaender, and H.-J. Voth (2017). Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital
and the Rise of the Nazi Party. Journal of Political Economy 125 (2).
Tabellini, G. (2008). The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 123 (3), 905–950.
27
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Society 1
Voting equilibrium under expulsion rule: mE = 18. We proceed by backward
induction, beginning with the vote about expelling agent number 2 in x. Recall that the
first agent votes against expulsion of every other agent, because her profit is increasing
in club size. Therefore, in every vote at least two agents vote against expulsion: the first
agent and the agent whose expulsion is under scrutiny. This implies that all the clubs with
size m ≤ 4 are stable equilibria. Define the stable equilibrium as m̂Ev , where v indexes
from the smallest to the largest stable equilibrium (so m̂E1 =2, m̂
E
2 =3 and m̂
E
3 =4.)
Lemma 1.1 At the vote about expelling agent m in x, all the agents in x indexed be-
tween 2 and the biggest stable equilibrium m̂Ev smaller than m, vote for expulsion. All
other agents vote against expulsions.
Proof 1.1 The aforementioned agents know that they will not be expelled if the vot-
ing proceeds further: They sit on or to the left of the next smallest stable equilibrium,
and their profit functions are strictly decreasing in m. All other agents know that they
will be expelled if the voting proceeds further, so they would like to stop the vote dynamic.
Lemma 1.2 If agent in position x vote for expulsion, then all agents with position
1 < i < x vote for expulsion as well.
Proof 1.2 Follows from Lemma 1.1.
Lemma 1.3 All the stable equilibra m̂Ev larger than 4 are characterized by the same
number of agents voting in favor and against expulsion (a tie).
Proof 1.3 Part I: If there is a majority of agents in favor of expulsion of agent m, expul-
sion occurs, and so the voting continues. Thus, this can not be a stable equilibrium. Part
II: Suppose there is instead a majority of agents against the expulsion when voting about
agent m. This implies that also the next vote about expelling agent m− 1 would have a
majority against expulsion, or result in a tie. It is thus not optimal for agent m−1 to vote
against expulsion, as his profit function is decreasing in club size. If this is true, it is not
optimal for any of the agents to the left of m− 1 (excluding agent 1) as well, by Lemma
1.2. Thus, there can not be a majority against expulsion (as this option only attracts the
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Table A1: Society 1, sequence of voting outcomes under expulsion rule.
Voting Favor Against Equilibrium
over expulsion expulsion outcome
3 2 1,3 Game stops
4 2,3 1,4 Game stops
5 2-4 1,5 Expulsion
6 2-4 1,5,6 Game stops
7 2-6 1,7 Expulsion
8 2-6 1,7,8 Expulsion
9 2-6 1,7-9 Expulsion
10 2-6 1,7-10 Game stops
11 2-10 1,11 Expulsion
12 2-10 1,11,12 Expulsion
13 2-10 1,11-13 Expulsion
14 2-10 1,11-14 Expulsion
15 2-10 1,11-15 Expulsion
16 2-10 1,11-16 Expulsion
17 2-10 1,11-17 Expulsion
18 2-10 1,11-18 Game stops
19 2-18 1,19 Expulsion
20 2-18 1,19,20 Expulsion
vote of agent m and agent 1), let alone this configuration be a stable equilibrium.
The lemmas imply that the stable equilibria m̂Ev larger than 4 are defined by the following
equation:




v−1 + 1, (7)
where on the left-hand side is the number of agents voting for expulsion, and on the right-
hand side is the number of agents voting against. Rearranging, we obtain the difference
equation that defines the sequence of stable equilibria:
m̂Ev = 2m̂
E
v−1 − 2, (8)
together with the initial condition m̂E3 = 4. The unique stable equilibrium m
E in a
population of size n is the largest stable equilibrium that satisfies m̂Ev < n. Table A.1
reports the outcome of the votes over every agent in a population of size n.
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A.2 Proofs of Society 2
Voting equilibrium under expulsion rule: mE = 16. Define m∗ the club size
that maximizes the expected profit for agent 1 and 2, and π(m∗) the corresponding profit
level. For m ≤ m∗, at least three agents (agents 1, 2 and the one under scrutiny) always
vote against expulsion. This implies that all clubs of size m ≤ 6 are stable equilibria, as
long as m∗ ≥ 6, which is the case in Scenario 2. For m > m∗, the voting behavior of the
first two agents is influenced by strategic concerns: They vote against expulsion, if and
only if the expected profits obtained at the current club size are greater than or equal
to the profits that they would obtain in a club of size equal to the next smaller stable
equilibrium. The voting behavior of all the other agents is the same as in Scenario 1.
Lemma 2.1 At the vote about expelling agent m in x, all the agents in x indexed be-
tween 3 and the biggest stable equilibrium m̂Ev smaller than m, vote for expulsion.
Proof 2.1 Almost identical to proof 1.1.
Lemma 2.2 All the stable equilibra m̂Ev larger than 6 are characterized by the same
number of agents voting in favor and against expulsion (a tie).
Proof 2.2 Almost identical to proof 1.3.




such that agent 1 and 2 vote against expulsion.
Proof 2.3: ∀m > m∗, agent 1 and 2 would like to block the club size at m (vote against
expulsion) if and only if the profits at that m are greater than the profits at the next
smallest stable equilibrium. For this to be true, the next smallest equilibrium must be
smaller than m∗, otherwise agents 1 and 2 would strictly prefer to shrink the club fur-
ther (vote for expulsion), as their profit functions are strictly decreasing in club size for
m > m∗.
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where on the left-hand size of the equations is the number of agents voting for the expul-
sions, and on the right-hand size is the number of those voting against. Rearranging, we
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together with the initial condition, m̂E5 = 6.
The profits of agents 1 and 2 as function of club size in our simulation are as follows:
π(m) =[01.3921, 1.4718, 1.5322, 1.5866, 1.6202, 1.643, 1.6477,
1.6494, 1.6415, 1.6381, 1.6301, 1.6212, 1.6142, 1.6077,
1.6004, 1.5956, 1.5885, 1.585, 1.5791], (11)
thus m∗ = 9. The largest stable equilibrium smaller than m∗ = 9 is equal to 8. The next
larger equilibrium defined by m̂Ev = 2m̂
E
v−1 − 4 is a club of size twelve. However, m = 12
does not satisfy the equilibrium conditions, because agent 1 and 2 attain higher profits in
a club of eight (π(8) = 1.6477) than in a club of twelve (π(12) = 1.6301). Therefore, to





and so is: 16, 32, 64 etc. The unique stable equilibrium mE in a population of size n is the
largest stable equilibrium that satisfies m̂Ev < n. Thus, m
E = 16. The stable equilibria
for all the n < 540 are plotted in Figure A10.
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Figure A10: Aristocracy, voting equilibria under expulsion rule
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